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Abstract 
This research investigates procurement scoring and the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) use of alternative financing methods, such as leases and public-
private ventures.  One of the major impediments to using alternative forms of 
procurement financing for acquiring defense capabilities is in the budgetary 
treatment, or “scoring,” of these initiatives by the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the congressional Budget 
Committees.  The current scoring policy that has been applied to many initiatives 
essentially negates the advantages from using alternative forms of financing.  
Therefore, this research examines existing policies and their adherence to statutes. 
It also investigates the recording methods of the various government organizations 
and committees and their documentation of obligations and outlays related to 
financing alternatives used by federal agencies.  Preliminary evidence suggests that 
this emerging topic has major importance for future DoD acquisitions in a resource-
constrained environment.  Included are recommendations for changes in budgetary 
scoring that encompass the full scope of federal obligations and expenditures while 
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Executive Summary 
In an era of limited resources, limited access to appropriated funds and 
growing mission demands, the Department of Defense (DoD) must consider 
alternative forms of financing, including leases and public-private partnerships 
(PPPs), to fund necessary mission requirements.  This research examines the 
budgetary treatment, or “scoring,” of these financial arrangements by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the 
House and Senate Budget Committees.  Every piece of congressional legislation 
must be scored in accordance with the federal budget process.  Scoring legislation is 
the process of tracking budget authority, projecting future federal outlays based on 
the budget authority, and recording the actual obligations and outlays in budget 
execution.  The scoring process can greatly affect a bill’s ability to be passed based 
on the determinations made by the CBO or Congressional Budget Committees.   
This research introduces the current applications of leasing and PPPs in the 
public and private sectors.  Additionally, an in-depth analysis of the current scoring 
process of leasing and PPPs conducted by the CBO and the Budget Committees will 
be discussed.  These government bodies represent the executive and legislative 
authorities for scoring and budget enforcement.  This analysis will be applied to 
three case studies, the budgetary treatment of Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPC), and two cases involving the use of PPPs in the Operation and 
Maintenance of Military Family Housing. 
Current scoring and general federal budget policies can sometimes negate 
the advantages of using alternative forms of financing such as leasing and PPPs.   
Therefore, these options are not used in the acquisition of major defense assets, 
even though they have been proven to generate substantial benefits for the private 
sector by providing greater flexibility in financing, encouraging innovation, reducing 
risks, and saving time and money on projects.  This research identifies the scoring 
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that applies financial responsibility and addresses fair treatment of the advantages of 
these initiatives.  The end goal is not to develop a solution that will revamp the 
current budget process, but to provide a policy that will secure funding for needed 
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Introduction 
The conventional method of procurement for major government acquisitions 
is full-cost and up-front funding.  Full-cost funding means that appropriations must 
be sufficient to cover a capital project prior to any unforeseen obligations.  In other 
words, the full cost of the program must be accounted for in the first year of 
obligation.  The policy provides transparency in the budget; in other words, all 
programs are scored in the same manner so that proper cost comparisons can be 
made between projects.  Additionally, full funding secures funds for the total cost of 
the project, minimizing the need for additional funding in the future.   
Full-cost funding forces military departments to analyze each project’s cost 
and benefits throughout its life.  It ensures that future congressional action is not 
required to pay for previous congressional spending decisions.  Also, full-cost 
funding empowers program managers to be responsible for time, schedule, and cost 
parameters of a project.  While full-cost funding certainly has its benefits, the policy 
can cause major fluctuations in budget appropriations. Particularly with large 
acquisitions, full-cost funding consumes a large portion of a military department's 
available funding resources—thus reducing the funds available to be requested for 
other programs.   
With the growing cost of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), particularly with 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and growing technology costs, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) is under increasing pressure to secure funding for large capital 
projects; this means a smaller percentage of the budget is designated for new 
procurement of combat capability.  Therefore, alternative financing arrangements, 
including but not limited to incremental funding, operating leases, out-leases, share-
in-savings contracts, and public-private partnerships (PPPs), have attracted interest 
as potential alternative financing methods.  This discussion will focus on the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of these financing methods, along with the 
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The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the Executive Branch and 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Congressional Budget Committees for 
the Legislative Branch have the collective responsibility for determining the costs for 
DoD appropriations bills.  This power, as dictated in the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, empowers these agencies as the official “scorekeepers,” who determine the 
actual cost of programs.  However, divergent scoring results arise between the 
OMB, CBO and the Budget Committees based on different interpretations of the 
same scoring principles and guidelines.   
This research focuses on the benefits of alternative financing and the scoring 
of alternative financing agreements.  In light of increasing fiscal pressure, these 
methods are necessary to provide funding for needed acquisitions.  A revised 
scoring policy is recommended to permit the DoD to fund additional procurement 
projects within the same budget constraints, using fiscally sound, generally accepted 
accounting principles.   
Background on Scoring Practices 
The term “scoring” describes the process in which the CBO and OMB 
estimate the budget authority required by proposed legislation.  Budget authority is 
the authority provided by law to incur financial obligations that will result in monetary 
outlays (OMB, 2006, June).  Scorekeeping determines, in a dollar amount, the 
budget effects of legislation and forecasts future outlays needed to fund a program.  
The “scorekeepers” consist of the Congressional Budget Committees, the CBO, and 
the OMB.  The scoring process and principles used by these entities greatly impact 
the scored cost of a program and, consequently, the ability of the legislation to be 
passed by Congress.  The current scoring guidelines greatly limit the advantage of 
financing arrangements which defer the up-front recording of cost and spread it over 
time by drawing on private-sector expertise and funding.  This section analyzes the 
scoring rules that apply to lease, lease-purchase, and capital acquisition 
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The scoring guidelines contained in OMB Circular A-11 emphasize two 
fundamental principles of federal budgeting: 
1) Federal commitments should be recognized up-front in the budget at 
the time those commitments are made. 
2) The federal budget should be comprehensive, capturing all financial 
activities of the federal budget. (President’s Commission on Budget 
Concepts, 1967, October) 
These principles form a policy known as full-funding that requires agencies to 
request all funding for a project up-front.  Prior to 1991, the budget authority and 
outlays for operating leases were recognized annually over the lease term in the 
form of annual lease payments.  This policy allowed agencies to acquire an asset 
without Congress’ consent for the full funding of the asset.   
In 1991, new guidelines issued by the OMB scored capital leases and lease-
purchases as up-front and requiring full-funding.  The policy is designed to force 
decision-makers to determine the entire cost of a project prior to approving the 
legislation.  The up-front funding allows for greater Congressional control over 
appropriations and also allows Congress to evaluate multiple pieces of legislation on 
a cost basis.  This transparency provides Congress with a standard with which to 
monitor the spending of both individual agencies as well as the entire federal 
government on an annual basis.   
Full-funding also better aligns Congressional budget estimates with the Anti-
deficiency Act (31 USC 1341), which prohibits the government from entering into 
obligations for the payment of money before an appropriation is made, unless 
authorized by law.  Full-funding is a policy rather than a law, which means that the 
interpretation of the policy can impact the budgetary treatment of a program.  
Whether an asset is acquired via direct purchase, lease, or through a combination of 
the two, scoring rules currently support full-funding.  These financial arrangements, 
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Federal Budget Principles: Purchases, Leases, and Alternative 
Financing 
Direct Purchases 
In an outright purchase: the government’s budget commitment is the 
purchase price of the asset.  Budget authority is equal to the asset’s purchase price 
at the time when authority is received to acquire the asset.  Outlays are then 
recorded when actual cash payments are made to the seller (CBO, 2003).  Outright 
purchases can be financed through borrowing at a low interest rate from the US 
Treasury (e.g., Treasury Bills sold publicly).  The scoring policy does not account for 
some inherent costs of directly purchasing an asset.  Full-funding an asset requires 
the government to assign a larger proportion of the available budget authority to the 
asset, leaving less budget authority available for other budget requests in any given 
fiscal year.  Under this policy, an opportunity cost exists as decision-makers must 
often decide between two mutually exclusive programs rather than funding both.  
Military Departments must often delay or cancel their budget requests for large 
capital investments. The military capabilities generated by these large projects are 
realized over several years, whereas the costs must be realized up-front.  Outright 
purchasing may force elected officials to choose between two or more justifiable 
programs, when both programs could be funded through other means.   
Leasing 
A simple lease arrangement involves an owner (lessor) renting the use of an 
asset to another party (lessee).  For example, the rental of an automobile from Avis 
implies no ownership.  However, leases can be structured in an almost limitless 
number of complex arrangements in which all terms are negotiable, and third-party 
financing may be involved.  To distribute the acquisition cost of an asset over its 
years of use, the government has the ability to lease the asset, or in some cases, to 
enter into a partnership with private companies to acquire the asset.   
To limit the discussion, leases within government are placed into four broad 
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substantial private risk.  The distinction between the different lease types determines 
how the CBO, OMB and the Budget Committees score budget authority for 
legislation.  Each lease category is discussed below. 
To be considered an “operating” lease, a lease must satisfy the following 
stringent criteria: 
1) Ownership of the asset remains with the lessor during the term of the 
lease and is not transferred to the Government at or shortly after the 
end of the lease period.  
2) The lease does not contain a bargain-price purchase option.  
3) The lease term does not exceed 75% of the estimated economic 
lifetime of the asset.  
4) The present value of the minimum lease payments over the life of the 
lease does not exceed 90% of the fair market value of the asset at the 
inception of the lease.  
5) The asset is a general-purpose asset rather than a special-purpose 
asset for the Government and is not built to unique specification for the 
Government as lessee. 
6) There is a private-sector market for the asset.  
7) Risks of ownership of the asset should remain with the lessor. (OMB, 
2006, June, part 8—appendices) 
Any lease not satisfying these stringent criteria will be viewed as a “capital” 
lease.  Requirements 5 and 6 (the need for a private-sector market for the asset and 
the requirement for the asset to be general purpose) essentially eliminate operating 
leasing for military equipment procurement.   
In both operating and capital leases, ownership remains with the lessor and is 
not transferred to the government at the conclusion of the lease period.  In contrast, 
lease-purchase arrangements allow ownership of the asset to be transferred (GAO, 
1997).  Determination of risk is another crucial determination in the budget-scoring 
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characteristics of the project.  The more governmental the project, the greater 
amount of risk is assigned to the government.  Legislation and lease-purchases use 
the following criteria to determine the amount of risk borne by the government.   
1) There should be no provision of Government financing and no explicit 
Government guarantee of third-party financing.  
2) Risks of ownership of the asset should remain with the lessor unless 
the Government was at fault for such losses. 
3) The asset should be a general-purpose asset rather than for a special 
purpose of the Government and should not be built to unique 
specification for the Government as lessee.  
4) There should be a private-sector market for the asset.  
5) The project should not be constructed on Government land.  
The interpretation of these guidelines has been the source of frustration for 
many private-public partnership initiatives.   
The budgetary treatment of the four categories of lease arrangements is 
summarized in Table 1 below.  
Table 1. The Budgetary Treatment of Leases and Private/Public Ventures 





Amount equal to asset cost 
recorded up-front; amount equal to 
imputed interest costs recorded on 
an annual basis over the lease 
period 
Amount equal to asset cost scored over 
the construction period in proportion to 
the distribution of the contractor’s costs; 
amount equal to imputed interest costs 






Amount equal to asset cost 
recorded up-front; amount equal to 
imputed interest costs recorded on 
an annual basis over the lease term 
Scored over lease term in an amount 
equal to the annual lease payments  
Capital Lease Amount equal to asset cost 
recorded up-front; amount equal to 
imputed interest costs recorded on 
an annual basis over the lease term 
Scored over lease term in an amount 
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Operating Lease Amount equal to total payments 
under the full term of the lease or 
amount sufficient to cover first-year 
lease payments plus cancellation 
costs recorded up-front  
Scored over lease term in an amount 
equal to the annual lease payments  
 (CBO, 2003, p. 9) 
 
For lease-purchases and capital leases, budget authority will be scored 
against legislation in the year in which the budget authority is first made available.  
The recorded amount is the estimated net present value of the Government’s total 
estimated legal obligations over the life of the lease term.  From a budget 
perspective, purchases, lease-purchases, and capital leases all attempt to acquire 
an asset over its total life and are scored similarly.  The only major difference 
involves the treatment of outlays in lease purchases with substantial private risk.   
Operating leases are different from capital leases or lease purchases 
because the lessee has no intention to purchase the asset.  The budget authority for 
operating leases will be scored in the first year budget authority is made available in 
the amount sufficient to cover the Government’s legal obligations (OMB, 2006, 
June).  Budget authority for operating leases is scored for the full cost of future lease 
payments in the first year of a lease; or, if a cancellation clause exists, budget 
authority for the first year is scored equal to the first year’s payment plus cancellation 
fees, with following years to be scored incrementally.  
Leasing provides a number of important advantages in addition to reducing 
the budget authority assigned to a project.  Leasing generally offers a higher degree 
of flexibility in operating assets, allowing modification of assets to meet changing 
needs.  A complement of services is typically included with a lease, allowing an 
organization to draw on the expertise and resources of the lessor.  Leasing also 
conserves capital, which would be required in either a down payment or outright 
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costs over multiple budgetary periods, which will more likely correspond with the 
useful life of the equipment.   
Alternative Financing Agreements: Public-private Partnerships 
In August 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published 
Alternative Approaches to Finance Federal Capital, which examined the increased 
usage of alternative financing by Federal agencies. The GAO identified ten 
alternative financing approaches used by Federal agencies to fund projects: 
1) Incremental funding, 
2) Operating leases, 
3) Retained fees, 
4) Real property swaps, 
5) Sale-leasebacks, 
6) Lease-leasebacks, 
7) Public-private partnerships, 
8) Out-leases, 
9) Share-in-savings contracts, and 
10) Debt issuance. 
The GAO report further recognized that these arrangements would be 
beneficial to agencies in that they would be able to acquire capital assets without 
first having to secure sufficient appropriations to cover the full cost of the asset 
(GAO, 2003, August).  Of these financing approaches, public-private partnerships 
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The scoring of public-private partnerships has been a very controversial and 
important budgetary issue to those seeking to utilize private-sector resources in 
government projects.  Because no two public-private partnerships (PPPs) are 
arranged exactly the same, each PPP must be carefully examined prior to any 
scoring determination.  Several of these financing agreements will be examined in 
the included Case Studies.  The major debate revolves around the determination of 
financial obligation and risk incurred under each of these agreements.  Because of 
the complexity and individuality of many of these arrangements, there is usually no 
precedent to guide their scoring. 
PPPs can be used by the government to exploit an underutilized asset  or to 
leverage private-sector financing in the short-term to acquire a public asset.  Leasing 
may only be a small part of the PPP.  In some cases, the government may benefit 
from the revenue a leased asset generates rather than benefit from the use of an 
asset—serving as the lessor rather than the lessee (CBO, 2003, p. 26).  
Unfortunately, the Budget Committees, OMB and CBO are typically conservative in 
their scoring of these arrangements and typically do not quantify the inherent 
benefits of these contracts from the overall budget authority assigned to the contract. 
The result is up-front budget authority scoring for the project, which may make it 
more difficult for the legislation to pass.   
In Case Study Number One, various alternative financing strategies involving 
governmental housing and buildings will be examined for potential applications to 
military capital acquisitions. In another Case Study, share-in-savings contracts will 
be examined utilizing the Energy Savings Performance Contracts case. Together, 
these case studies will demonstrate how current scoring guidelines are used to 
score alternative financing arrangements based solely on the government’s financial 
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Barriers to Alternative Financing 
A 2003 report written by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) addressed 
the issues involving the use of long-term leasing agreements; in particular, it 
documented their ability to: 
1) Reduce the budget’s ability to fully depict the Federal Government’s 
financial commitments. 
2) Undermine fiscal policy by circumventing controls such as limits on 
deficits and caps on Federal Spending. 
3) Allow an agency to avoid facing the full costs of purchasing an asset at 
the time it decides to buy it, thus making acquisitions that are not cost-
effective more likely. 
4) Raise the costs of some investments because a lease purchase is, 
over the life of an asset, inherently more costly to the government than 
a direct purchase. (CBO, 2003, p. ix summary) 
Due to these concerns, the CBO has an incentive to capitalize the majority of 
long-term lease agreements, which is similar to scoring the lease as a direct 
purchase.  Indeed, there is an inherent interest cost disadvantage when the payment 
of an asset is delayed.  Since the lease involves payments over time, it is subject to 
these terms. The scorekeepers use the prime rate or an average of the interest rate 
of marketable Treasury securities as their standard discount rate.  Since private 
leasing firms require a return that exceeds the prime rate, leasing arrangements 
incur an additional cost: the difference between the prime rate and the negotiated 
rate.  The scoring rules also assume that parity exists between public and private 
firms when operating, managing, or maintaining an asset.  In addition, the current 
scoring guidelines do not account for the following benefits and costs reductions: 
 Reduced financial risk if the agency no longer needs the asset due to 
uncertainty about future needs 
 Lower labor costs  
 Fewer bureaucratic and administrative requirements and their 
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 Lost opportunity cost for an otherwise viable, desirable project delayed 
for a given period of time when awaiting direct appropriations 
 Cost associated with the transference of risk 
 Cost of maintaining the status-quo 
 Decreased risk of performance to the government 
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Scoring Case Studies 
Practical Usage of Alternative Financing 
Introduction 
As previously mentioned, the GAO identified 10 capital financing approaches 
in use by government agencies as alternatives to the conventional full-funding 
approach (GAO, 2003, August).  Five of these 10 approaches were selected for 
examination on the basis of their potential application towards funding large DoD 
procurements of capital equipment.  These financing strategies include: Incremental 
funding, Operating leases, Public-private partnerships, Share-in-savings contracts, 
and Debt issuance.  Combined, these strategies reduce the up-front budgetary 
impact of capital projects, make use of all existing public resources, and incorporate 
private-sector efficiencies within government projects. 
In 1996, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act; this bill 
created the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) to address the costly 
challenge of maintaining adequate housing for service members.  Of the 300,000 
military housing units in existence, an estimated 200,000 units were in need of repair 
at an approximate cost of $16 billion, which would restore the units to acceptable 
conditions (DoD, 1999).  The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) also possesses 
legislative authority to utilize alternative financing techniques.  To alleviate the large 
up-front costs of their projects, these agencies selected various PPPs as alternatives 
to conventional funding.  Several MHPI and VA projects are presented below to 
discuss the scoring determination and potential broader application to capital 
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Public Private Partnerships  
In a 2003 study by the GAO, PPPs were identified as the most prevalent 
alternative financing method, with over 54 different agreements in existence within 
US agencies (GAO, 2003, August).  PPPs are a particularly popular alternative-
financing technique for the DoD due to their great flexibility and ability to apply 
private-sector capital and expertise to public needs and resources.  In this symbiotic 
relationship, each party benefits from its participation in the partnership.  The 
government is unable to be the most efficient provider of all necessary services and 
equipment items for the public sector. OMB Circular A-76 provides guidelines to 
outsource public requirements to the private sector and to promote efficiency (OMB, 
2003).  In some cases, adaptable technologies or industrial capacity that could 
address the requirements of the military already exist in the private sector.  A PPP 
can be formed to exploit these opportunities in a manner conventional full-funding 
procurement cannot. 
Despite the efficiencies of PPPs, the scoring of PPP legislation has become 
increasingly conservative—limiting the flexibility originally granted by statutory 
authority to several Federal agencies.  The CBO and OMB, but not to the same 
degree, believe that Federal agencies are using special purpose public-private 
ventures as a way to access private capital without triggering lease-purchase 
guidelines and to avoid recording obligations up-front in their budgets.  This section 
will discuss these concerns and other scoring issues using several examples from 
the DoD’s privatization of military housing and the VA’s enhanced-use lease 
authority.    
The majority of PPPs involve the Federal Government’s real property or other 
underutilized assets that can be developed, revitalized, or managed by the private 
sector.  The key element of a PPP is that the government possesses some non-
monetary asset that has value.  In a typical fully funded contract, the government 
must set aside funds sufficient to cover all obligations in the first year of the project.  
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conditions in lieu of full payment to reduce its obligations.  These assets can include 
loan guarantees, longer lease terms, debt issuance, guaranteed minimum rates of 
occupancy, or even the transfer of the asset at the completion of the lease term.  
Figure 1 depicts the wide degree of versatility of PPP contracts in managing 
responsibility throughout the life of an asset. 
Figure 1.  Degree of Government Responsibility in PPP Contracts   
(Dovey & Eggers, 2007, p. 5)  
 
Below is a listing of the most common PPP relationships in existence.   
The Design-Build (DB): Under this model, the government contracts with a 
private partner to design and build a facility in accordance with the requirements set 
by the government. After completing the facility, the government assumes 
responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility. This method of procurement 
is also referred to as Build-Transfer (BT). 
Design-Build-Maintain (DBM): This model is similar to Design-Build except 
that the private sector also maintains the facility. The public sector retains 
responsibility for operations. 
Design-Build-Operate (DBO): Under this model, the private sector designs 
and builds a facility. Once the facility is completed, the title for the new facility is 
transferred to the public sector, while the private sector operates the facility for a 
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Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM): This model combines the 
responsibilities of design-build procurements with the operations and maintenance of 
a facility for a specified period by a private-sector partner. At the end of that period, 
the operation of the facility is transferred back to the public sector. This method of 
procurement is also referred to as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT): The government grants a franchise 
to a private partner to finance, design, build and operate a facility for a specific 
period of time. Ownership of the facility is transferred back to the public sector at the 
end of that period. 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO): The government grants the right to finance, 
design, build, operate and maintain a project to a private entity, which retains 
ownership of the project. The private entity is not required to transfer the facility back 
to the government. 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate/Maintain (DBFO, DBFM or DBFO/M): 
Under this model, the private sector designs, builds, finances, operates and/or 
maintains a new facility under a long-term lease. At the end of the lease term, the 
facility is transferred to the public sector. PPPs can be used for existing services and 
facilities in addition to new ones. Some of these models are described below. 
Service Contract: The government contracts with a private entity to provide 
services the government previously performed. 
Management Contract: A management contract differs from a service 
contract in that the private entity is responsible for all aspects of operations and 
maintenance of the facility under contract. 
Lease: The government grants a private entity a leasehold interest in an 
asset. The private partner operates and maintains the asset in accordance with the 
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Concession: The government grants a private entity exclusive rights to 
provide, operate and maintain an asset over a long period of time in accordance with 
performance requirements set forth by the government. The public sector retains 
ownership of the original asset, while the private operator retains ownership over 
any improvements made during the concession period. 
Divestiture: The government transfers an asset, either in part or in full, to the 
private sector. Generally, the government will include certain conditions with the sale 
of the asset to ensure that improvements are made and citizens continue to be 
served (Dovey & Eggers, 2007, p. 5). 
PPP Examples: Government Privatization Initiative 
The statutory authority for Military Family Housing, originally granted in 1996, 
and later made permanent in 2005, allows the government to enter into public-
private partnerships without individual project approval from Congress (10 USC 
2871-2885).  The relative complexity of PPP contracts frequently generates 
disagreements amongst the CBO, OMB, and agency representatives concerning the 
interpretation of the scoring guidelines.  The goal of the CBO and OMB is to provide 
to decision-makers an accurate account of the amount of legal obligations of the 
federal government.  PPPs represent a proven method of accessing private capital 
and expertise.  The following DoD and VA case studies analyze the value of the 
PPPs and the scoring issues in the cases.   
Public-private Partnership Case Study 1: Ft. Hood Family Housing, LLP 
Description of Project 
In 2001, Fort Hood Family Housing was selected as one of the first PPPs by 
the Army when it contracted Actus Lend Lease to manage all aspects of the 
development, financing, construction, and property management for the Fort Hood 
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a 50-year lease to maintain the 5,912 units located at Fort Hood, Texas (CBO, 2003, 
p. 28).   
Financial Details 
At the conclusion of the initial 50-year lease, the Army has the option to 
renew for another 25-year lease term.  If the Army does not renew, all assets remain 
government property.   
The housing project has an estimated cost of $260 million.  The burden of 
that cost is divided as follows: $186 million came in the form of a loan entered into 
by the partnership; Bank One provided $20 million in private equity; and the Army 
invested $52 million in equity.   
Actus will also provide $6 million in equity at the end of the fifth year for 
additional development.  The contract also provides Actus with a preferred return on 
equity of 10-12% and a portion of partnership earnings up to a predetermined 
ceiling.  Actus will also receive payment equal to a fixed percentage of the project’s 
gross revenue for its management services.   
Scoring Impact and Issues 
The Army was able to obtain $273 million in financing for an up-front cost of 
$52 million (CBO, 2003, p. 42).  Only the Army’s direct investment of $52 million was 
scored by the OMB as an immediate obligation.  The transfer of land and pre-
existing housing units to Actus had no budget impact based on the absence of any 
cash transaction between the two entities.  The rental of the housing units to service 
members was viewed by the CBO as individual transactions between private parties.  
This distributed the budget impact for the housing expenditures to an annual 
expense vice an up-front cost.  Additionally, the $186 million obtained via loan is 
viewed by the Army as debt of a private entity and not the government.  According to 
the contract details, the Army does not have a legal obligation to cover the costs of 
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land, and the management terms of the contract effectively place the housing under 
government control.   
The budgetary impact and cost of this PPP has particular significance as the 
Fort Hood Family Housing, LP, was one of the first PPPs initiated by the DoD.  The 
scoring debate has two clearly polarized viewpoints.  From the CBO scorekeepers’ 
perspective, the government’s total obligations remain hidden in the financial 
framework of the partnership.  This perspective does not provide Congress the 
needed information to calculate the future budget impact.  Also, an important 
underlying issue remains: is this type of partnership actually cost-effective?  The 
deal stipulates a mandated 10-12% return on equity plus a management fee based 
on the partnership revenues.  Could the government provide this service at similar 
cost and service levels?   
Another critical issue for the CBO/OMB is the long-term (50 years) lease 
agreement that represents a long-term commitment to the Fort Hood, Texas base.  
The long-term lease limits the year-to-year budget control of Congress and obligates 
the Federal government to unspecified future obligations.  
From the service and partnership perspective, the PPP allows the DoD to 
immediately resolve the issue of substandard and insufficient military housing that 
threatens the quality of life and retention of the military.  The costs of the project are 
distributed throughout the life of the project.  The venture utilizes the housing 
allowances of the individual service members to finance the agreement over the 
lease term.  Actus Lend Lease, with over 30,000 managed units, is able to offer 
considerable private expertise that helps achieve a more efficiently run housing 
project and higher customer-satisfaction levels (Fort Hood Family Housing, 2007).   
PPPs also provide stronger incentives to complete the project on-time and 
under budget.  In 2003, the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office reported that 
73% of non-Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects were over budget, and 70% 
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delivered late (Dovey & Eggers, 2007, p. 7).  The UK’s previous experience in 
public-private partnerships has demonstrated that non-financial cost factors such as 
quality, service, timeliness, and expertise can often justify the involvement of the 
private sector in providing public financing.   
This case study highlights the scoring impact of these alternative financial 
arrangements.  For the Fort Hood Family Housing Project, should the up-front 
obligation for the government be scored at $52 million or $273 million?  The CBO 
asserts that although only a small portion of the total investment has been fronted by 
the DoD, the DoD has overall controlling interest in the project.  The venture is 
structured to fulfill the service’s needs; the Army shares in the earnings of the 
venture above a threshold and also controls the housing units at the end of the 
lease.  Additionally, military tenants have preferential status for obtaining occupancy, 
and the venture must maintain affordable rents for service members (CBO, 2003, p. 
29).  The CBO argues that the Housing Project is a purely government-driven 
project.   
The issue is not whether or not the contract is structured for the service’s 
interests—of course it is.  The issue is whether this type of alternative financing is 
beneficial to both the service and, more importantly, to the government as a whole.  
In this case, the Army should have the flexibility to improve existing military housing 
with a lower up-front cost of $52 million.  However, Congress and Army leaders must 
realize that the total obligation to the government will exceed the $273 million total 
investment upon conclusion of the project.  A balance between Congress’ desire to 
control the purse versus the services’ need to supply critical services to their 
members must be reached.  The budgetary impact of CBO/OMB scoring will be 
further analyzed in the following case studies.   
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The Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA) was granted authority to enter into 
enhanced-use lease contracts in 1991 (38 USC 8161-8169).  The legislation allows 
the VA to lease government land to private entities for up to 75 years for the purpose 
of developing the land for VA or private needs.  Payments resulting from the lease 
can be used by the VA without further Congressional oversight (CBO, 2003, p. 31).  
The VA then has the option of leasing back the privately developed facilities for its 
uses.  The VA can enter into these agreements without Congressional approval and 
only must notify Congress within 60 days of the enhanced-use lease agreement.  
Enhanced-use leases are particularly attractive to the VA due to its vast holdings of 
underdeveloped land and facilities.    
Description of Project 
The Chicago West Side Regional Headquarters (CWSRH) project’s 
enhanced-use lease is an example of the flexibility of PPPs, but the project also 
presents difficult scoring issues to the CBO/OMB.  In 2002, the VA entered into a 
series of agreements used to fund a new $60 million Chicago headquarters building 
and parking facility (CBO, 2003, p.33).   
Financial Details 
The project involved numerous interdependent agreements.  West Side 
Enhanced-use Lease Trust was created, with the VA named as sole beneficiary.  A 
four-acre plot adjacent to the VA Medical Center in downtown Chicago was included 
in the trust, using a 35-year enhanced use lease agreement.  MedPark, a private 
contractor, is responsible for the construction, outfitting, and management of the 
office and parking facilities.  The Illinois Department Finance Authority issued $9 
million in taxable revenue bonds to help fund the project.  The proceeds from the 
bond issuance were loaned to the Trust to pay for the design and construction of the 
facility.  Under the lease terms for the building, the VA is obligated to a two-year 
lease for a minimum of 95% of the office and parking facilities.  The leases are 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 22 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
lease term.  Additionally, if the VA occupies any portion of the building, it must cover 
at a minimum the amortization and interest of the trust’s loans plus all the trustee’s 
expenses (CBO, 2003, p. 34). 
Scoring Impact and Issues 
In October 2001, the OMB and VA settled how obligations and outlays would 
be treated for leaseback agreements (CBO, 2003, p. 44).  A leaseback agreement is 
a lease in which the government is the lessor vice the lessee.  The agreement 
stipulated that the VA should treat leasebacks of terms up to two years in length as 
operating leases, as long as the VA had no right of first refusal on future lease 
terms.  The property lease was drafted to be a non-cash barter transaction without 
budget impact. The revenues received by the VA from the trust will offset the VA’s 
initial investment and be under the agency’s discretion.  The initial lease of the 
building was designed to be an operating lease, and the borrowing of the Trust to be 
private borrowing.  The VA does not have right of first refusal for future leases as 
mandated by their 2001 agreement with the OMB.   
The CBO is concerned with the VA’s obligation to cover the cost of capital for 
the Trust even if the agency reduces its usage of the facility.  The CBO points out 
that the CWSRH enhanced-use lease agreement represents a significant long-term 
obligation by the VA and is not actually limited to the initial two-year lease term.  As 
such, the budget impact of the project far exceeds the VA’s estimation.  
Congressional scoring is only rendered on new legislation; since the project was 
passed under existing authority, the scoring issues remain unresolved.  From the 
VA’s perspective, the agreement was crafted with only limited future risk to the 
government.  The facilities were built in a highly popular section of downtown 
Chicago—increasing the likelihood of finding replacement tenants if demand for 
usage fell below initial levels.  Additionally, the VA benefited, as sole beneficiary of 
the Trust, from proceeds from the leasing.  The obligation of the Trust to the VA 
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The VA’s Chicago project is a demonstration of how a government agency 
was able to utilize an underdeveloped asset to fulfill an immediate need.  The project 
was designed to limit the initial up-front cost of the venture to the initial two-year 
lease agreement, with construction and design of the facilities to be paid for via 
private equity.  Future lease agreements would be entirely governed by the private 
trust for the 35-year agreement, with the VA receiving preferential treatment in 
facility usage.  Utilizing legislative authority, the VA was able to construct the optimal 
size facility and benefit from any private usage of the facility.   
An obstacle to greater usage of this type of funding is the budgetary treatment 
from the OMB and, particularly, the CBO.  In 2002, HR 3947, the Federal Property 
Management Reform Act, was introduced. This legislation grants federal landholding 
agencies additional authorities in acquiring, managing, improving, and disposing of 
their property assets; it also provided incentives to manage these assets efficiently 
(CBO, 2002).  Although the bill did not receive the necessary approval, it did 
highlight the position of the CBO towards PPPs.  In its Cost Estimate for the Bill, the 
CBO stated it viewed “hybrid entities like public-private business ventures” as 
governmental—meaning that, since the purpose of the venture is mostly or entirely 
governmental, any borrowing or outside financing activities would be viewed as new 
federal borrowing authority.  Additionally, it felt that most, if not all, of the public-
private ventures should be subject to the lease-purchase scoring guidelines 
contained in OMB Circular A-11.   
The scoring of private involvement remains a frustrating issue as the CBO 
reserves the right to alter its interpretation of the scoring guidelines—since scoring is 
an incremental, evolutionary process. For six years (1996-2002), the CBO scored 
military housing ventures consistently with the OMB.  However, in 2002, the CBO 
changed its position, viewing the ventures as additional borrowing.  In regards to 
share-in-savings contracts, the CBO reversed a decade-old policy of scoring ESPCs 
budget-neutral to scoring them as additional budget authority.  Other agencies, such 
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authority to utilize private partnerships (Perry, 2002, April 18).  While the CBO’s role 
is to remain objective and impartial, its interpretation of scoring guidelines is often 
unpopular with Congressional supporters of PPPs. If Congress seeks to continue the 
recent successes demonstrated by the military housing or the VA’s enhanced-use 
contracts, its members should offer directed scorekeeping that promotes efficient, 
economic use of DoD resources.  It is our opinion that the efficiencies of these 
ventures may be translated on a larger scale to the procurement, management, and 
disposal of military capital equipment.  The DoD can more efficiently procure and 
manage its assets, but only if it receives legislative authority and budgetary 
treatment allowing it to do so.    
The decision to undertake a project must be separated into two parts:  
1) Is the project worthwhile to undertake? 
a) Do the benefits exceed costs?  
b) Does the return exceed the required rate of return on 
investment? 
c) Does this project warrant the limited resources that it will 
consume? 
2) Given that this project is worthwhile, what is the best method to finance 
the project? 
ESPC Case Study 
Supporters of Energy Savings Performance Contracting (ESPC) believe it is 
the most cost-effective means of completing building energy upgrades and 
associated savings.  The concept has existed since 1992, but it was not 
implemented by the Department of Energy until 1995 (DoE, 2006, June).  ESPC is a 
means of using utility savings to pay for all project costs.  There are many 
possibilities of projects, such as energy-management systems, interior and exterior 
lighting, boiler replacement or repair of steam systems, and replacement of Heating, 
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Administration, 2007).  This form of contracting normally guarantees project costs, 
savings and performance of installed equipment.  However, the majority of risk is 
borne by the contractor, not the government. The Department of Energy explains: 
An ESPC project is a partnership between the customer and an energy 
service company (ESCO).  The ESCO conducts a comprehensive energy 
audit and identifies improvements that will save energy at the facility. In 
consultation with the agency customer, the ESCO designs and constructs a 
project that meets the agency’s needs and arranges financing to pay for it.  
The ESCO guarantees savings sufficient to pay for the project over the term 
of the contract.  After the contract ends, all additional cost savings accrue to 
the agency.  Contract terms up to 25 years are allowed. (DoE, 2006, June) 
 Since 2005, more than 400 federal ESPC projects, in 46 different states, by 19 
different federal agencies (altogether worth $1.9 billion) have generated $5.2 billion 
in energy cost savings (DoE, 2006, June). 
The use of ESPCs is ideal for organizations that seek out alternative means 
of funding programs.  As the Department of Defense (DoD)’s discretionary portions 
of the budget continue to become strained, high competition for those funds has the 
potential to leave programs unfunded.  Many facilities throughout the DoD were built 
shortly after World War II.  Few new facilities have been built replacing the old.  
Dated DoD equipment and assets—such as the B-52 bomber, SH-60 helicopter and 
many others—are continuously being funneled additional funds.  The ESPC is a 
means to cut costs while continuing overall functionality of facilities and assets.  
Other means of financing, such as PPPs and various forms of leases, are used 
successfully today by the private sector.   
An example of the benefits of an ESPC pertains to many homeowners. A 
homeowner will evaluate the cost of improving his/her home with the expected 
benefits and determine the means of financing such improvements.  The 
government and its facilities are no different.   But many vendors are willing to offer 
their supplies and equipment to help defer the required payments over some time 
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For instance, one can assume the proposed cost to renovate or improve a 
home was $10,000.  This improvement would replace the windows, lighting and 
appliances.  The home would become more efficient and reduce utility costs.  The 
vendor and homeowner would agree upon some baseline on expenses once 
improvements were installed, and the difference would be used to “pay off” the 
vendor for its services.  If there are no savings, the vendor does not get paid.  
Assume the contract period is eight years.  Table 2 illustrates two scenarios.  The 
first assumes the homeowner paid the vendors $10,000 up-front; then he realizes a 
30% or 50% reduction in his existing $5,000 annual utility expense.  The second 
scenario assumes the homeowner pays for the improvement in some agreed-upon 
ESPC with the vendors over five-years—with the same 50% reduction in annual 
utility expense and a 3.00% rate of inflation.   
Table 2. ESPC Scenarios 
 
 
 Cost of Repair 10000 exp yr $5,000 reduction $1,500       
  inflation 1.03 
new 
exp $3,500         
              
  NPV 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Scenario 1 2,795 10,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 
Scenario 2 2,266 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 1,500 1,500 30% 
Vendor 
(30%) 530 10,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 0 0 
              
Scenario 1 11,326 10,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
Scenario 2 3,776 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 2,500 2,500 50% 
Vendor 
(50%) 7,549 10,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 0 0 
              
 Payback period for scenario 1 would be $10,000/$1,500 which is 6.67 years.     
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Scenario 1 in Table 2 illustrates that if the improvement is fully funded up-
front in Year 0, there is a positive Net Present Value on the investment for both the 
30% and 50% reductions in utility expenses.  Scenario 2 demonstrates, with no 
initial investment, a positive Net Present Value on the investment for both the 30% 
and 50% reductions in utility expenses.  The vendor would also benefit from 
assisting the homeowner with the improvements.  It is a win-win situation.  The 
homeowner does not have to “fully fund” the project and achieves the same result 
with an alternate form of financing.   Today, many private companies and local 
governments implement ESPCs.   
Within the government and many federal agencies, there are two primary 
points of view pertaining to ESPCs and their application in the budget.  The first, 
advocated by the OMB, is that ESPCs should be scored at zero because they pay 
for themselves.  The other, advocated by the CBO, is that the funds must be 
obligated in case of cancellation or termination fees that could result in a violation of 
The Anti-deficiency Act.  The Anti-deficiency Act, also known as 31 USC Section 
1301(a), is one of the major laws in which the Congress exercises its constitutional 
control of the public purse.  Thus, ESPCs continue to be debated, and their future 
availability is uncertain.  Yet, as demonstrated above, ESPCs are clearly a viable 
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Recommendations and Conclusion 
Recommendations 
This research addressed only a limited number of the total available options 
to finance a capital asset.  All factors being equal, the government’s borrowing rate 
is lower than the borrowing rate for private-sector firms. However, the analysis 
presented here has hopefully addressed several scenarios in which government 
agencies would be able to leverage their available resources by involving the private 
sector via some form of Public-private Partnership.  This is a cost-effective 
alternative to up-front funding.  In many cases, agencies are forced to seek 
alternative funding measures or do without the asset.  Presented below are several 
recommendations to modify the current budget-scoring process and scoring 
guidelines in an attempt to promote improved economic efficiency in public projects.   
Scoring of Leasing  
The crucial question in categorizing a lease is determining what constitutes 
purchase of an asset.  Long-term leases that provide the government with ownership 
of the asset are scored up-front in an amount equal to the net present value of the 
future lease payments for the asset.  Conversely, leases that provide the 
government with only partial use of the asset’s economic life can be scored in 
annual obligations as an operating lease (CBO, 2003, p.viii).  The scorekeepers 
apply strict criteria in determining between an operating or capital lease.  The result 
(and intent of the guidelines) is that almost all DoD equipment is acquired via 
purchase or capital leases.  The OMB guidelines for operating leases add two 
additional requirements to the four basic criteria used by the Federal Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB).  These two requirements include:    
1) There is a private-sector market for the asset.  
2) The asset is a general-purpose asset rather than being for a special 
purpose of the government and is not built to the unique specification 
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These two requirements restrict the use of operating leases as a financing 
option for the procurement of military equipment.   Table 3 outlines the criteria for 
Public vs. Private-Operating-Lease determination. 
Table 3. Public vs. Private Operating Lease Determination 
OMB Requirements to Be Considered an 
Operating Lease (Public) (OMB, 2006, June, 
pp. 3-4) 
Basic Criteria in Lease Determination 
(Private) (Lee, 2003, pp. 10-11) 
Ownership of the asset remains with the lessor 
during the term of the lease and is not 
transferred to the Government at or shortly after 
the end of the lease period. 
The lease transfers ownership of the property to 
the lessee by the end of the lease term. 
The lease does not contain a bargain-price 
purchase option. 
The lease contains an option to purchase the 
leased property at a bargain price. 
The lease term does not exceed 75% of the 
estimated economic lifetime of the asset. 
The lease term is equal to or greater than 75% 
of the estimated economic life of the leased 
property. 
The present value of the minimum lease 
payments over the life of the lease does not 
exceed 90% of the fair market value of the asset 
at the inception of the lease. 
The present value of rental and other minimum 
lease payments, excluding that portion of the 
payments representing executory costs, equals 
or exceeds 90% of the fair value of the leased 
property. 
The asset is a general purpose asset rather 
than being for a special purpose of the 
Government and is not built to unique 
specification for the Government as lessee.  
There is a private-sector market for the asset.  
 
The stricter guidelines were adopted in 1991 in response to the frequent use 
of lease-purchases in the 1980s to acquire assets, including prepositioned ships or 
buildings.  The CBO cited four major concerns of the increased use of leasing that 
helped inspire the new guidelines. It asserts that using leases to acquire assets 
would: 
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2) Undermine fiscal policy by circumventing controls such as limits on 
deficits and caps on discretionary spending, 
3) Allow an agency to avoid facing the full costs of purchasing an asset at 
the time it decides to buy it, thus making acquisitions that are not cost-
effective more likely, and 
4) Raise the costs of some investments because a lease-purchase is, 
over the life of an asset, inherently more costly to the government than 
a direct purchase. (CBO, 2003, p. ix) 
We propose to limit the guidelines to the four basic criteria accepted in the 
private sector, in Table 3, with one additional caveat.  A fifth guideline would include 
a proposal that highlighted the following issues:  
 The estimated total use (years) of the asset by the government.  
 The reason as to why operating leasing would be preferred over direct-
purchase, lease-purchase or other type of financing. 
 Explicitly addressed ownership options for the asset.  Also, the 
probability the asset would be damaged in its use and ultimately be 
purchased.   
 Salvage value for the asset at completion of the lease—discussing any 
outside markets for the asset to determine potential market value. 
The proposal would be submitted to the OMB, CBO, and Congressional 
Budget Committees as part of the legislative process.  If these new guidelines for 
operating leases were adopted, greater financing flexibility would be restored to the 
DoD.  In addition, the guidelines would not hinder Congress’s ability to allocate 
financial resources effectively. 
Scoring of Alternative Financing  
Alternative financing consists of almost any financing option or combination of 
options that can be used in lieu of conventional full-funding.  The private sector has 
metrics such as profit or stock price that help motivate corporate executives in their 
selection of the most beneficial financing method for their company.  Without these 
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agency needs and Congressional control of the purse.  Current scoring guidelines 
are designed to provide the decision-makers in Congress with the most informative 
representation of current and future government obligations.  The lease-purchase 
guidelines have the effect of favoring full-funding versus other forms of financing.  
Yet, in certain situations, the needs and resources of the government can be 
combined with the capabilities of the private sector to form a partnership that is 
beneficial to both parties.  Public-private Partnerships represent the most practical 
financing method available that harnesses these capabilities and addresses the 
needs of the DoD.  
Unfortunately, the financial details of Public-private Partnerships are typically 
unique and involve complex financial relationships, limiting the availability of useful 
precedents to help predict the scoring outcome.  The National Council for Public 
Private Partnerships (NCPPP) cites one of the major impediments in the budget 
scoring policy to be the ambiguity surrounding the current scoring guidelines (2007).  
The OMB scoring rules represent policy vice actual, hard-fast rules and are 
intentionally vague to allow interpretation by the CBO or OMB.  Reviewing the 
scoring determination through an open forum between concerned policies would not 
only clarify the intent of the scoring rules, but also improve adherence to them.  The 
Council also asserts that scoring confusion could further be eliminated if an 
“Alternative Financing” committee was formed by the OMB to assist agencies that 
seek private-sector involvement (2007).  The committee can be established 
independently from the OMB to eliminate any conflicts of interests or questions of 
neutrality.    
Additionally, the scoring process would be improved if the scoring rules 
placed greater emphasis on economic efficiency rather than the determination of 
budget authority.  For instance, share-in-savings contracts that have outlays 
resulting only from the net savings to the government should be scored as budget 
neutral or have some other discount factor that reflects the financial benefits of the 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 33 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
benefits from these ventures do not have an explicit value that can be readily 
estimated.  The inability to easily or accurately estimate these benefits causes them 
to be ignored in the scoring process.  In these cases, representatives from the 
prospective Alternative Financing committee could provide their best estimate of the 
projected savings of private involvement—either by discounting the budget authority 
scored for the project or by including this dollar amount independent of the scoring 
estimate.  In either manner, Congress would be informed of the benefits of the 
alternative financing.  The current scoring rules are overly conservative and neglect 
to include the majority of the benefits of PPPs in scoring budget authority.  
Conclusion 
The scoring guidelines’ objectives of consistency and transparency in the 
budget process have reduced the feasibility of alternative financing ventures.  
Currently, there are many opportunities to improve the aging infrastructure and 
reduce the lifecycle costs of a government project through greater private-sector 
involvement.  The major impediments to realizing these goals are the interpretation 
of the scoring guidelines by the CBO and the OMB and the absence of legislation 
authorizing such private-sector participation.  The government would benefit from 
either a revision to the current scoring guidelines or a more comprehensive 
interpretation of the current scoring rules.  We assert that if these changes are 
implemented, they would allow the DoD greater responsiveness and flexibility in 
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